The effects of size on local banks´ funding costs by Vins, Oliver & Bloch, Thomas
  JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT 
FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
 
FACHBEREICH WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTEN
 
  
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES: FINANCE & ACCOUNTING
Oliver Vins and Thomas Bloch 
 
The Effects of Size on Local Banks’ Funding Costs 
 
 
No. 189 
November 2008  
 
 
 
 
OLIVER VINS
* & THOMAS BLOCH
† 
 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF SIZE ON LOCAL BANKS’ FUNDING COSTS
‡ 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 189 
November 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1434-3401 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Johann-Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Finance Department, Mertonstr. 17, 60325 Frankfurt a. M., 
Germany, Corresponding author: fon: +49 175 318 5202, E-Mail: vins@finance.uni-frankfurt.de 
† Johann-Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Finance Department, Mertonstr. 17, 60325 Frankfurt a. M., 
Germany, Corresponding author: fon: +49 163 362 3822, E-Mail: bloch@finance.uni-frankfurt.de 
‡ This paper is part of a project funded by the German Savings Banks Association (DSGV) and conducted in 
cooperation with the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University in Frankfurt am Main. The contribution of DSGV is 
gratefully acknowledged. The expressed opinions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the affiliated organizations. We thank René Fischer, Andreas Hackethal, Yassin Hankir, Sascha Steffen, 
and Mark Wahrenburg for valuable comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are our own. 
Paper accepted for presentation (among others): Australasian Finance & Banking Conference (Sydney, 2007), 
Midwest Finance Association 57th Annual Meeting (San Antonio, 2008), Southwestern Finance Association 
47th Annual Meeting (Houston, 2008), Midwest Economics Association Annual Meeting (Chicago, 2008), 
Eastern Finance Association Annual Meeting (St. Pete Beach, 2008), HVB Doctoral Seminar (Eltville, 2007). 
 
The working papers in the series Finance and Accounting are intended to make research findings available to other 
researchers in preliminary form, to encourage discussion and suggestions for revision before final publication. Opinions are 
solely those of the authors. 
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Abstract
Motivated by the recent discussion of the declining importance of deposits as
banks’ major source of funding we investigate which factors determine funding costs
at local banks. Using a panel data set of more than 800 German local savings and
cooperative banks for the period from 1998 to 2004 we show that funding costs
are not only driven by the relative share of comparatively cheap deposits of bank’s
liabilities but among other factors especially by the size of the bank. In our empirical
analysis we ￿nd strong and robust evidence that, ceteris paribus, smaller banks
exhibit lower funding costs than larger banks suggesting that small banks are able
to attract deposits more cheaply than their larger counterparts. We argue that this
is the case because smaller banks interact more personally with customers, operate
in customers’ geographic proximity and have longer and stronger relationships than
larger banks and, hence, are able to charge higher prices for their services.
Our ￿nding of a strong in￿uence of bank size on funding costs is also in an in-
ternational context of great interest as mergers among small local banks - the key
driver of bank growth - are a recent phenomenon not only in European banking that
is expected to continue in the future. At the same time, net interest income remains
by far the most important source of revenue for most local banks, accounting for
approximately 70% of total operating revenues in the case of German local banks.
The in￿uence of size on funding costs is of strong economic relevance: our results
suggest that an increase in size by 50%, for example, from EUR 500 million in total
assets to EUR 750 million (exemplary for M&A transactions among local banks) in-
creases funding costs, ceteris paribus, by approximately 18 basis points which relates
to approx. 7% of banks’ average net interest margin.
Key words: Regional banks, bank funding, mergers & acquisitions
JEL: G21, G34, L25, C231 Introduction
The future role of deposits as banks’ major and at the same time cheapest
source of funding has recently attracted attention by both researchers and
practitioners. Both alike argue that the importance of deposits has been di-
minished because more and more money traditionally held as deposits is today
invested in alternative investment products o￿ered by non-bank ￿nancial in-
termediaries, a trend typically referred to as disintermediation (see Edwards
and Mishkin (1995) and Hackethal (2004)). Norden and Weber (2008) ￿nd
that customer deposits lose ground in relative terms while inter-bank liabil-
ities increase as a source of banks’ funding. Furthermore, the emergence of
securitization is regarded as another key trend responsible for the declining
importance of deposits in bank funding as it provides banks with an alterna-
tive way of ￿nancing their lending activities and the opportunity to take their
loans (partially) o￿ balance sheet. Only the recent liquidity crisis in the sec-
ond half of 2007 caused by the subprime mortgage crisis in the US has again
highlighted the advantages of bank deposits providing banks with liquidity
and ￿exibility when other sources of funding dry up.
Motivated by the recent discussion and market developments we examine the
importance of customer deposits for banks’ funding by investigating the de-
terminants of funding costs. The role of deposits as part of banks’ funding
mix is especially important in view of the German market because access to
customer deposits is regarded as key strength of local banks. In Germany,
customer deposits account for 70 to 80% of local banks’ total liabilities and
in volume terms even outweigh banks’ loan portfolios. Using a panel data set
comprising bank level ￿nancials for over 800 German local savings and coop-
erative banks for the period from 1998 to 2004 we show that funding costs
are not only driven by the relative share of relatively cheap deposits in banks’
funding mix as suggested by Norden and Weber (2008) but among other fac-
tors especially by the size of the bank. 1 In our empirical analysis we ￿nd
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1 We de￿ne funding costs as the average interest rate paid on liabilities calculated
as a bank’s interest expenses over average interest-bearing liabilities.
2strong and robust evidence that, ceteris paribus, smaller banks exhibit lower
funding costs than larger banks suggesting that small banks are able to attract
deposits more cheaply than their larger counterparts. We propose that this is
the case because smaller banks interact more personally with customers, op-
erate in customers’ geographic proximity and have longer and, thus, stronger
relationships than larger banks and, hence, are able to charge higher prices for
their services. In line with Berger et al. (2005) we argue that larger banks, in
contrast, operate at a greater distance, interact more impersonally with their
customers and have shorter and more transaction based relationships, i.e. they
compete on terms and conditions rather than on customized services. Bank
growth, especially in the course of mergers and acquisitions, is often accom-
panied by streamlining of bank networks, eliminating regional proximity to
customers and therefore the basis for close customer relationships.
Our ￿nding of a strong positive relation between bank size and funding costs is
of great interest as mergers among small local banks are a recent phenomenon
in European banking that is expected to continue in the future. At the same
time, net interest income remains by far the most important source of revenue
for most local banks, accounting for approximately 70% of total operating
revenues. Furthermore, the size e￿ect is of strong economic relevance: our
results suggest that a 50% increase in size from EUR 500 million in total assets
to EUR 750 million (exemplary for M&A transactions among local banks)
increases the funding costs and therefore simultaneously decreases the net
interest margin by approximately 18 basis points -this amounts to more than
7% of the average net interest margin of a German local bank in our sample,
which is less than 300 basis points. Especially the comparison to banks’ average
net pro￿t margin of 24 basis points in our sample highlights the economic
signi￿cance of this e￿ect.
While previous research has extensively investigated the determinants of banks’
net interest margins based on work by Ho and Saunders (1981), there is no
study that considers the determinants of interest income and interest expenses
(funding costs) separately. With this paper we contribute to closing this gap
and examine the determinants of banks’ funding costs. We also go beyond the
national view on bank pro￿tability and consider di￿erences in market concen-
tration and the economic environment on the local market level.
The remaining paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview
of the literature closely related to our work. Section 3 lays out the empirical
framework for our analysis and derives key hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the
panel data set, the di￿erent samples used for our analysis as well as empirical
speci￿cations of the model. Section 5 summarizes the empirical results and
section 6 provides some robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
32 Literature review
Although there is no particular literature on the impact of bank size on banks’
funding costs a number of authors analyze the competitive advantages small
banks have due to their decentralized set-up and their customer proximity
compared to larger banks. For example, Berger et al. (2005) analyze how bank
size a￿ects the quality of bank-customer relationships. Based on empirical re-
search in the US, they show that larger banks interact with their customers
at greater distances, more impersonally and more often via phone or the in-
ternet, thereby reducing the personal interaction which is the basis for sound
bank-customer relationships. In addition, they ￿nd that banking relationships
with smaller banks tend to be longer and more often exclusive. With respect
to the relationship strength of small banks Uchida et al. (2007) empirically
con￿rm these ￿ndings using a unique Japanese data set. Stein (2002) builds
a theoretical model to explain the relation between bank size and the use of
information in customer relationships. He provides theoretical evidence that
soft information - a key feature of small business lending but also a require-
ment to provide clients with suitable ￿nancial advice - can be better dealt
with by decentralized organizations such as small banks while large organiza-
tions act better upon hard transferable information. The main reason is that
soft information cannot be transported reliably between hierarchies. Although
Stein (2002) uses small business lending as an example, the rationale can be
applied to other products as well. Furthermore, Carter et al. (2004) argue that
small banks that operate in less competitive markets as many of them do also
have a greater incentive to invest in customer (loan) relationships because
there is less chance that the customer will switch to a competing bank. A
number of empirical studies provide evidence that small banks indeed lever-
age on their competitive advantages by showing that small banks are able to
earn higher (risk-adjusted) returns on activities such as small business lend-
ing than large banks (e.g. Berger and Udell (1996), Sapienza (2002), Carter
et al. (2004)). Although most research on the e￿ects of bank size is related to
relationship banking in lending, i.e. the bank’s ability to facilitate monitoring
and screening to overcome problems of asymmetric information in exclusive
lending relationships, Boot (2000) explicitly suggests that phenomena from
relationship banking are not limited to lending but may be observed for other
￿nancial services such as deposit taking, check clearing, cash management ser-
vices etc. as well - an interpretation we o￿er for our empirical evidence of a
strong relationship between bank size and banks’ funding costs. 2
General industrial economics provide an alternative explanation why strong
customer relationships - a feature of small rather than large banks - positively
2 See Ongena and Smith (1998) and Boot (2000) for a good overview on previous
research relating to relationship banking.
4impact banks’ interest margins by investigating customer switching costs. For
example, Tirole (1988) points out that long-term customers who appreciate
the service provided by their bank tend to switch their bank only in case of sig-
ni￿cant price di￿erences, hence, customers appreciating existing service levels
provide banks with additional bargaining and pricing power. With regard to
banks’ funding costs or deposit taking, in particular, Klemperer (1987) devel-
ops a theoretical framework and also postulates that switching costs reduce
competition over existing customers since they allow to di￿erentiate otherwise
equivalent products. Degryse and Ongena (2005) further show for Belgium
banks that banks can gain market power also from geographical proximity to
their customers. Customers are willing to pay higher prices (or accept lower
deposit rates) if their bank is located closer to them, which can be explained
by the lower transportation and transaction cost.
In addition to literature investigating the advantages of small banking orga-
nizations vis-￿-vis large banks and their respective e￿ect on banks’ ￿nancial
performance there is also a large strand of literature on the determinants of
banks’ net interest margins which from a methodological point of view we
regard as closest to our own work. Most research on determinants of banks’
net interest margins is based on the model developed by Ho and Saunders
(1981). In their analysis of banks’ interest margins Ho and Saunders (1981)
extend a securities dealership model to banks. Thereby, they introduce banks
as risk-averse dealers in deposit and loan markets that demand a positive in-
terest spread for the provision of immediate liquidity, i.e. the banks’ ability
to take on deposits and provide loans under the uncertainty of the actual
timing of deposit supply and loan demand. In their theoretical model Ho and
Saunders (1981) show that this spread depends on the degree of bank man-
agement’s risk aversion, the concentration of the market the bank is operating
in, transaction size and interest rate risk. In their empirical application they
evaluate the sensitivity of these determinants including further variables to
control for institutional imperfections and regulatory constraints such as im-
plicit interest payments (free bank services o￿ered to customers), default risk
and opportunity cost for holding required reserves.
Several researchers have extended this model and have veri￿ed its ￿ndings
empirically. For example, Allen (1988) introduces loan heterogeneity and thus
cross-elasticities of demand between bank products and proposes a reduction
of banks’ interest margins as a result of diversi￿cation. McShane and Sharpe
(1986) empirically test the model using panel data for Australian banks ver-
ifying the inverse relationship between net interest margins and measures of
market power and the degree of absolute risk aversion. Angbazo (1997) ex-
plores the function of credit risk, interest rate risk (esp. its interaction with
default risk) and o￿-balance sheet banking assets on banks’ net interest mar-
gins. He ￿nds that risk e￿ects are heterogeneous across bank size classes with
smaller (local) banks’ margins being more sensitive to interest rate and de-
5fault risk than those of their larger peers. Saunders and Schumacher (2000)
￿nd that net interest margins are higher for banks located in more segmented
markets, both geographically and by business activity. Maudos and de Gue-
vara (2004) measure competition in di￿erent markets and demonstrate that
the fall of banks’ net interest margins in Europe is compatible with an increase
in market power and concentration that was (partly) o￿set by the reduction
of interest rate risk, credit risk and operating costs. Valverde and FernÆn-
dez (2007) consider the ability of diversi￿ed banks to cross-subsidize costs of
price competition by incurring non-interest income. They expand the analy-
sis by including the impact of non-interest income on interest margins and
market power of banks. Their results support Maudos and de Guevara (2004)
at least partly explaining the remarkable coexistence of decreasing interest
margins and increasing market concentration in European banking. Most re-
cently, Norden and Weber (2008) examine the shift in German banks’ funding
mix from customer deposits to inter-bank lending and observe a positive rela-
tionship between the share of deposits of banks’ funding mix and net interest
margins.
Another related strand of literature takes a direct view on loan and deposit
prices as opposed to overall net interest margins, eliminating bank-level prod-
uct portfolio e￿ects but also inter-industry di￿erences resulting from widely
di￿ering local market conditions. Most papers examine the relationship be-
tween market concentration/competition and bank product prices while con-
trolling for other macroeconomic factors. For example, Berger and Hannan
(1989) show that US banks in the most concentrated local markets are found
to pay 25-100 basis points less on money market deposit accounts than banks
in the least concentrated markets. Fischer (2005) o￿ers an extensive analysis
of the relationship of prices and market concentration for the German mar-
ket. Applying the price-concentration relationship to deposit rates Hannan
and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) also ￿nd evidence that
deposit rates are signi￿cantly more rigid in concentrated markets than in less
concentrated markets, i.e. banks in concentrated markets respond slower to
market interest rate changes. Although we focus our research on the impact of
bank size rather than market concentration it needs to be highlighted that in
Germany small banks such as public savings and cooperative banks typically
operate in regional and, hence, more concentrated markets than large banks -
a factor we later explicitly control for.
3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses
In the following, we explore the role of bank size for banks’ funding costs and
derive hypotheses for our empirical analyses in the following section.
6According to Allen and Gale (2000) bank-based markets such as Germany’s are
characterized by strong bank-customer relationships. This ￿nding especially
holds for small local banks, which in the case of Germany account for approx-
imately 50% of the total deposit and loan markets. The small local banks’
immediate proximity to their customers as well as their decentralized orga-
nizational set-up are regarded as their main competitive advantages vis-￿-vis
larger banks. According to anecdotal evidence the regional proximity is often
also accompanied by close personal ties outside the formal bank-customer re-
lationship creating strong loyalty with the bank. Conducting lending activities
on the basis of such close bank-customer relationships is generally referred to as
relationship banking. It is characterized by banks’ access to customer-speci￿c,
often proprietary information and the ability to evaluate customer pro￿tability
based on multiple interactions with the customer (see Boot (2000)).
While previous research focuses on the competitive advantages of small banks
mainly in the context of relationship banking we extend this view to banks’
other activities. We argue that customers generally value small banks’ prox-
imity and their superior utilization of soft information resulting in more per-
sonalized service o￿erings and advice and are therefore willing to pay higher
prices or accept lower interests on their deposits in return. In line with Boot
(2000) we propose that banks may be in a position to leverage the bargaining
power stemming from their strong customer relationships in lending by charg-
ing higher prices not only for loans but also for other banking products. For
example, banks might cross-subsidize their lending business through bundled
product o￿erings or exploit the customers’ bank dependency resulting from
the hold-up problem.
Furthermore, larger banks tend to have fewer branches, especially in rural
and less populated areas. Thereby, the average distance between a customer
and the nearest branch is bigger than for smaller local banks. As Degryse
and Ongena (2005) point out, this is not only inconvenient for customers
but also increases transportation costs and thus decreases switching costs. In
the same vain, the customers’ true appreciation of the bank’s services that are
superior to those of other banks as described above does also not only increase
customers’ preparedness to pay higher prices but also increases switching costs
(Tirole (1988)). Furthermore, as service levels at other banks are ex ante not
observable for customer their switching costs increase further. That is, by
changing to a new bank with unknown service standards customers run the
risk to loose the bene￿ts of individual services designed to their individual
￿nancial requirements.
This leads to our ￿rst hypothesis H1:
Hypothesis H1: Small banks are better able to build strong customer re-
lationships than large banks due to information advances, more customized
7services, more convenient locations and personal ties. Consequently, they
bene￿t from the ability to charge higher fees and margins for their services
such as o￿ering lower interest rates on deposits. Thus, bank size is positively
related to banks’ funding costs.
Size e￿ects are most pronounced in the course of mergers and acquisitions,
which should have an immediate adverse e￿ect on banks’ funding costs. In
the process of mergers and acquisitions banks often need to adjust their or-
ganizational structure and business processes to adapt to increased size. This
leads to branch network consolidation, centralization of processes and sta￿ re-
dundancies, consequently jeopardizing or even eliminating the basis for strong
customer relationships and customer proximity and, hence, the competitive
advantages of small banks (Berger et al. (2005)). Furthermore, with increas-
ing size and organizational complexity management’s abilities to monitor the
bank’s day-to-day business may also become less e￿ective (Caves (1989)).
This leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis H2: Merger-induced changes in bank size and organizational
complexity jeopardize small banks’ competitive advantages and make e￿ective
control more di￿cult. Hence, merger induced increases in bank size have a
positive e￿ect on merging banks’ funding costs.
However, merger related negative e￿ects on banks’ funding costs do not only
result from increased size and organizational complexity but also from tempo-
rary distortions of merging bank’s day-to-day business: Merger execution and
post-merger integration may (temporarily) distract managers from e￿ectively
managing bank’s day-to-day operations, which would adversely a￿ect banks’
productivity and, hence, sales performance. Berger et al. (1999) suggest down-
sizing and culture clashes as potential triggers for business disruptions and,
thus, reasons for inferior operating performance. Furthermore, customers are
more likely to switch banks following a merger because often mergers are ac-
companied by potential inconveniences for customers such as the uncertainty
of future service levels, the reduction of the number of (local) branches and
the requirement for customers to change their account details. In the case of
mergers associated inconveniences can pose substantial costs for the customer
that may at least partially o￿set the bene￿ts from the existing bank-customer
relationship and decrease switching costs. The loss of customers would directly
translate in the loss of deposits that are required to be replaced by alternative
means of funding such as interbank loans typically resulting in higher fund-
ing costs. Alternatively, banks might be forced to o￿er their customers higher
deposit rates to prevent them from switching.
This results in our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis H3: Mergers positively a￿ect merging banks’ funding costs be-
8cause of temporary disruptions of day-to-day operations and merger related
loss of customers. Hence, we expect an additional increase in funding costs
beyond the normal size e￿ect. However, as some of the e￿ects are tempo-
rary in nature we expect merger related negative e￿ects to decrease in the
post-merger years.
In addition to the ongoing merger activity, the German banking market is also
characterized by intensifying competition partly caused by the market entry
of foreign banks but also by accelerating technological developments such as
the increasing acceptance of phone and online banking. 3 Phone and online
banking decrease transportation costs and, hence, customers are unlikely to
be prepared to continue to pay a premium for those services that can be
conveniently accessed over the internet.
This leads us to our fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis H4: Technological advances and increasing competition in re-
cent years have rendered some advantages of smaller, rather local banks for
which the customer had traditionally been prepared to pay a premium void.
Hence, we expect the magnitude of the positive relationship between bank
size and funding costs to persist but to decrease over time.
4 Empirical speci￿cations
4.1 Description of sample
For our analysis we merged three data sets containing detailed ￿nancial infor-
mation on over 800 local banks in Germany, regional economic data as well
as data on local market concentration for the period from 1998 to 2004. Per
the end of 2004, there were 477 savings banks and 1,290 cooperative banks
operating in Germany, of which approximately 400 and 440, respectively, are
included in our sample. In terms of total assets savings and cooperative banks
included in our sample correspond to approx. 80% and 55%, respectively, of
the total population. The economic data and the concentration measures are
reported on the level of the respective administrative district (counties and
cities) the respective bank is located in. In total, Germany comprises of 440
of such administrative districts.
For several reasons local banks in Germany pose a very interesting subject
for economic research. Firstly, with a market share in lending and deposit
3 The competitive pressure resulting from online banking is not captured by our
market concentration variable which is based on bank branch statistics.
9taking of approximately 50%, they are still the dominant provider of credit
and banking services to individuals and SMEs in Germany. Secondly, both
banking groups follow what is known as the "regional principle", i.e. in its
respective sector each institution exclusively serves well de￿ned and separated
regional business areas that often correspond to the 440 districts in Germany.
This allows us to account for local rather than national market concentration
and economic characteristics. Thirdly, all banks use the same accounting and
reporting principles and operate on the basis of the same legal foundation.
Fourthly, all savings and cooperative banks are independent institutions with
their own business strategy and operational setup. In sum, these banks form
a large group of highly comparable but independent entities - an ideal setup
to analyze the implications of di￿erent bank and market characteristics with
econometric models.
Our merged data set is an unbalanced panel data set comprising bank ￿nan-
cials as they were reported by the respective banks. In case one bank merged
with another bank during the observation period, its ￿nancials are reported
until the year before the merger took place and the bank drops out of the
sample thereafter. Consequently, the data does not only re￿ect size changes
due to organic growth or di￿erences between small and large banks but also
accounts for size changes due to mergers. For example, if one bank merges
with another bank of equal size, the absorbing institute doubles in size from
one year to the next. In total, this sample contains 5,686 observations for the
period from 1998 to 2004.
The merged data set includes local economic data as well as information on the
local market concentration in each bank’s respective administrative district,
i.e. city our county, and for each year of the observation period.
The balance-sheet and income-statement data is taken from BvD’s Bankscope
database. The merger information was derived manually from the bank history
provided in Bankscope and validated with LexisNexis as well as a proprietary
list of savings banks mergers provided by the German Savings Banks Asso-
ciation. 4 Information on market concentration is based on regional branch
statistics provided by the German Central Bank. Macroeconomic data was
provided by the Statistical State O￿ces and is available for each of the 440
administrative districts in Germany.
4 We thank the German Savings Banks Association ("Deutscher Sparkassen und
Giroverband (DSGV)") for the provision of this data.
104.2 Empirical model and variables
In order to investigate the relationship between bank size and banks’ funding
costs and to test the hypotheses established above we de￿ne a multivariate re-
gression model with Interest Expenses / Total Liabilities as measure for banks’
funding costs as dependent variable and Ln(Total Assets) as measure for bank
size as our key explanatory variable. For the correct speci￿cation of our regres-
sion model, we build on the insights gained from the theoretical framework
developed by Ho and Saunders (1981) on the determinants of banks’ net in-
terest margins. As the net interest margin is calculated as interest income net
of interest expense - the latter of which we refer to as funding costs in our
analysis - their model is highly relevant for our research as all determinants of
banks’ funding costs simultaneously pose determinants for banks’ net interest
margin. The work by Ho and Sounder (1981) has been extended signi￿cantly
in subsequent years. Among others Allen (1988), McShane and Sharpe (1985),
Angbazo (1997), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Maudos and de Guevara
(2004) as well as Valverde and FernÆndez (2007) adjust and adapt the model
to increase its general applicability. Ho and Saunders (1981) and subsequent
literature suggest that factors in￿uencing the interest margin can be classi￿ed
into four categories. Besides the size of the bank’s operations, these are: bank
speci￿c e￿ects (BS), market concentration (MC), economic environment (CT)
and individual bank characteristics: 5
FCit = f(Sizeit BSit MCit CTit ǫit)
In our empirical model we control for all four categories with the following
variables. A detailed description of each variable including the calculation is
provided in Table 1.
The logarithm of total assets Ln(Total Assets) is the explanatory variable of
interest in our analysis. To control for general bank heterogeneity we add fur-
ther bank speci￿c variables. In the vain of Maudos and de Guevara (2004) we
use Operating expenses / Total Assets to re￿ect the bank’s overall cost struc-
ture and implicitly as a proxy for management’s (in)e￿ciency. We assume the
more e￿cient the management overall, i.e. the lower the relative operating
cost of the bank, the lower the funding cost, implying a more e￿cient man-
agement of the bank’s funding activities. Implicit Interest Payments controls
for the fact that many banks provide additional free services in combination
with deposit accounts, e.g. free usage of ATM network, account statements or
comprehensive advice. These extra services are regarded as implicit interest
payments as deposit rates might be lower than market rates to remunerate
banks not only for their service of immediate liquidity provision but also for
5 Individual bank characteristics are accounted for as bank ￿xed e￿ects in our panel
regression analysis.
11free services provided together with deposit accounts. In line with Ho and
Saunders (1981) and Angbazo (1997), we calculate Implicit Interest Payments
as the amount of operating expenses that cannot be covered by non-interest
income. Furthermore, some banks might focus more on provision income as
it o￿ers potentially higher margins. Consequently, they might cross-subsidize
anchor products such as loans and deposits with revenues from other services.
We include Non-Interest Income / Total Assets to control for these di￿erences.
Following McShane and Sharpe (1985) and Maudos and de Guevara (2004)
we use Equity / Total Assets as proxy for the degree of bank management’s
risk aversion. 6 In line with Angbazo (1997) one could alternatively interpret a
bank’s capitalization as a proxy for the bank’s risk of ￿nancial distress. Since
a bank with a strong capital base has many di￿erent sources of ￿nancing avail-
able, it is less dependent on customer deposits and, thus, might be o￿ering
lower deposit rates compared to a bank that is more depending on customer
deposits. The Deposits / Loans ratio is used to control for the overall funding
structure of the bank. It re￿ects to what extend the bank is able to ￿nance
its lending activities using customer deposits. A bank with more deposits at
hand is expected to o￿er on average lower deposit interest rates than a bank
with a scarce supply of deposits. In a further robustness check we explicitly
include three variables re￿ecting the funding structure of the bank: Demand
Deposits / Total Assets, Savings Deposits / Total Assets and Deposits from
Banks / Total Assets denote the share of total assets that is ￿nanced with the
respective source of capital. This allows us to capture the impact of di￿erent
sources of funding on the funding cost in more detail (Norden and Weber
(2008)). Most pronounced e￿ects on bank size originate from mergers and ac-
quisitions. In order to control for other or additional e￿ects from M&A activity
we introduce a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respective bank
is involved in a merger or an acquisition in the respective year. As we argue
that bank size has a positive impact on the bank’s funding cost amidst other
temporary negative merger related e￿ects we expect a positive sign for M&A
activity. We also include an interaction term M&A activity*Ln(Total Assets)
to capture any changes in magnitude of the coe￿cient of the size e￿ect in the
context of mergers.
In addition to bank characteristics, we use the local market concentration
(Local HHI) to control for the competitive structure in the respective local
markets. Berger (1995) or Gilbert (1984), for example, show that such con-
centration measures may be used as a proxy for market power. As data for
total assets, loan and deposit volumes is not available on the level of adminis-
trative districts for all (esp. private) banking groups, we determine the market
concentration as the Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl-Index on the basis of the num-
6 We emphasize the point also made by Maudos and de Guevara (2004) that equity
over average total assets measures capitalisation and is restricted from presenting
the true risk aversion due to imposed bank capital requirements.
12ber of branches of any one banking institution in each district over the total
number of bank branches in the respective area. We assume that funding costs
decrease with market concentration and therefore expect a negative sign.
Furthermore, we control extensively for the local economic environment. First
of all, we control for the current interest rate level as this is arguably one of the
main drivers behind banks’ funding costs. Although many studies show that
banks normally do not pass on full market interest rate adjustments (or at
least not in a timely manner) to their customers (for example see Hannan and
Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992)) it can be assumed that the
interest rate level is closely correlated with rates paid on new deposits. Hence,
higher market rates increase the average funding cost and vice versa. As risk
free rate we apply the 1-year Euribor. This is in line with common practice,
e.g. for transfer rate calculation or bank valuation. Using only one standard
reference rate for all banks in the same year, does not re￿ect the term structure
of deposits of an individual bank. However, we do not adjust the reference rate
to the individual term structures because, ￿rstly, the term structure of local
banks does not di￿er signi￿cantly between banks. Secondly, the yield curve is
relatively ￿at during the observation period, thus, slight di￿erences in the term
structure do not yield meaningful di￿erences in funding cost. We include the
Yield Curve Slope in our analysis as one might argue that it is the slope of the
yield curve that determines the bank’s ability to generate earnings by allowing
a maturity mismatch between the lending and the deposit taking side (term
transformation). Consequently, banks might be willing to pay higher deposit
rates in a market environment with steeper yield curves. At the same time the
slope of the yield curve might a￿ect the investment decision of customers. They
can be expected to invest into longer term maturities if the spread between
short and long-term interest rates is bigger. The regional economic strength
measured as GDP per inhabitant (Local GDP) in￿uences the availability of
deposits and, therefore, is expected to have a negative sign. The Savings Rate
of local private households directly in￿uences the supply of deposits to banks.
A negative sign is expected as well.
In addition to the aforementioned variables, we include dummy variables for
each bank to control for time-invariant individual characteristics of each bank
and dummy variables for each year to capture speci￿c time e￿ects.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 in the appendix provide descriptive statistics for the unbal-
anced dataset employed.
Average bank speci￿c characteristics are shown in Table 2 for the total sample
as well as bank size classes dividing the total sample into four groups. In line
with our hypothesis H1 the descriptive analysis already shows that funding
costs increase with increasing bank size. Further ￿ndings include a decline in
operating expenses with increasing bank size indicating the existence of scale
13economies. Implicit Interest Payments decrease with size due to economies of
scale in providing branch and ATM networks or online banking to customers.
Finally, the equity ratio decreases with size, potentially indicating that bank
managers feel more secure the larger and thus more diversi￿ed their business
model is.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the local economic environment and
contrasts rural and urban areas as well as East and West German municipal-
ities, where - even after more than 15 years post reuni￿cation - one can see
signi￿cant di￿erences. Worth mentioning is the signi￿cant di￿erence in GDP
per inhabitant. Urban areas compared to rural areas as well as Western com-
pared to Eastern areas tend to be notably wealthier on average, respectively.
With regard to the market concentration, urban areas are less concentrated
than rural areas in which often only regional savings and cooperative banks
are present. Considering that foreign competitors and specialized retail insti-
tutions, e.g. Citibank, are only present in bigger cities, this is in line with our
expectations.
Finally, Table 4 reveals time trends within our observation period from 1998
to 2004. Most visible is the decrease in funding cost since 2001, which merely
re￿ects the concurrent decline in interest rate levels. In the same period, the
average size of banks has grown constantly. The majority of this growth can
be attributed to the ongoing merger wave among both savings banks as well as
cooperative banks. It is also worth mentioning that cooperative banks are still
signi￿cantly bigger in number but smaller in size than savings banks. That is,
on average there is only approximately one savings bank per district but more
than two cooperative banks.
4.3 Econometric methodology
As Maudos and de Guevara (2004) point out, it is reasonable to assume that
characteristics that are individual for each bank in the sample in￿uence the
interest margin and, thus, also the funding costs. The clear advantage of using
panel data is that it allows to capture these time invariant ￿xed e￿ects. Time
invariant e￿ects di￿er in the cross section, but do not change over time. Thus,
to exploit this additional information we use a ￿xed e￿ect OLS regression
model. Speci￿cally, we use a so-called Least Square Dummy Variables model
where we include additional dummy variables for each bank into the regres-
sion and estimate the resulting model with ordinary least square (see Baltagi
(2001)). The fact that the sample of banks used in our analysis is not a ran-
dom draw but rather represents almost all existing banks (esp. in the case of
savings banks) does not suggest the application of random e￿ects regression
(see Wooldridge (2002)). A Hausman test con￿rms that for our purposes ran-
14dom e￿ects would lead to inconsistent estimators. We control for time trends
by including time-period dummy variables in our regression analysis.
We did not follow a two-step approach as suggested by Ho and Saunders (1981)
for three major reasons. In line with the argument made by Maudos and de
Guevara (2004), too many observations would be dropped in a two-stage ap-
proach. Furthermore, we deliberately do not split the observed funding costs
into a pure spread and market imperfections as Ho and Saunders (2004) pro-
pose. This work rather follows a similar approach like McShane and Sharpe
(1985) and Angbazo (1997) and treats all explanatory variables as equal de-
terminants of the funding costs. Last but not least, a two step approach poses
some di￿culties in verifying the signi￿cance of the coe￿cients of the second
step for the overall model/relationship as standard errors of the second step
regression are econometrically di￿cult to adjust for standard errors from the
￿rst step.
5 Empirical results
Table 5 provides a summary of our regression results. Results of our base
model are depicted in column (1). In Hypothesis H1 we postulate that bigger
banks are less able to build strong customer relationships compared to their
smaller peers. As a result we expect larger banks, ceteris paribus, to show
higher funding costs. The models in Table 5 strongly support this hypothe-
sis: bank size (Ln(Total Assets)) shows a positive sign, suggesting a positive
relationship between bank size and the bank’s interest expense. This e￿ect is
signi￿cant at the 1% level. However, the estimate for the impact of size on
funding costs could be distorted by banks that follow an aggressive growth
strategy based on lucrative rates on deposits, i.e. competitively high rates to
attract additional deposits. The model in column (2) uses the year-to-year
growth of deposit volume to control for this e￿ect. As expected the growth
variable shows a signi￿cant and positive sign. In column (3) the base model
is amended to include dummy variables for M&A activity in order to ensure
that our results are not driven by mergers. We also include an interaction
term of size and M&A activity (M&A activity * Ln(Total Assets)) to under-
stand whether the size e￿ect is of a di￿erent magnitude in the case of merger
related growth. Con￿rming hypothesis H2 the relatively small coe￿cient of
the interaction term indicates that there is a positive relation between size
and funding cost with regard to merger activities. However, as the negative
sign indicates the e￿ect is slightly smaller than for the whole sample. In line
with our hypothesis H3, which suggests an even more pronounced e￿ect in
the year of the merger due to integration e￿orts, we observe an additional
positive e￿ect from M&A activity on funding cost in the same year in which
a bank is involved in a merger as indicated by the signi￿cant positive sign
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tion the two lagged M&A activity dummy variables show that the additional
positive e￿ect vanishes after one year and is not present in the two years fol-
lowing the merger. The in￿uence of bank size on the funding costs remains
signi￿cant and positive when controlling for mergers. In the model in Column
(4) we control for the in￿uence of non-interest income on the funding costs
which is signi￿cantly positive, suggesting that banks use fees and commission
income to cross-subsidize deposit taking activities. Furthermore, in Column
(5) we check for the in￿uence of the slope of the yield curve and ￿nd contrary
to our expectations a signi￿cant negative in￿uence on funding cost. Column
(6) presents our base model excluding the variable that controls for implicit
interest payments in order to show that results remain the same despite the
fact that operating expenses and implicit interest are both calculated based
on operating expenditure and therefore are correlated. We also introduced the
development of the stock market as an additional control variable since one
could argue that to a certain extent the availability of deposits is driven by the
availability of alternative investment opportunities. Again, we ￿nd our main
results con￿rmed but do not report these ￿ndings for conciseness reasons.
In order to account for potential di￿erences in the funding structure between
banks we add three control variables indicating the shares of the di￿erent
sources of funding. The results are shown in column (7). The share of demand
deposits shows a negative relationship with the funding costs, i.e. the higher
the portion of assets ￿nanced with demand deposits the lower the funding
costs. Given that demand deposits are normally non-interest bearing the re-
sult is expected. Savings and deposits from banks in contrast are on average
more expensive than the average funding (deposit interest) rate, resulting in
a positive sign. The e￿ect of size on the funding costs remains unchanged in
direction and magnitude in all cases. To test our fourth hypothesis and in
order to ensure the robustness of our ￿ndings we re-run our base regression
model using varying observation periods. Table 6 shows that the size e￿ect
remains the same in direction but slightly decreases in magnitude over time
which con￿rms hypothesis H4, which postulates that the relationship aspect
has become less important over time due to technological advances such as
phone and online banking as well as intensi￿ed competition in German retail
banking. Most of our control variables remain unchanged. Some turn insignif-
icant when using shorter observation periods.
By large, all the remaining control variables are highly signi￿cant in all analy-
ses and show signs as predicted. For example, the higher the bank’s operating
expenses, the higher the funding costs. Hence, if management is less able to
run the whole banking operations e￿ciently, it is on average also less able to
manage the funding activities properly. Highly signi￿cant in all regressions
is also the negative relation between implicit interest payments and funding
costs. That is, the more free services a bank o￿ers to its customers the more
16customers are willing to accept lower interest rates for their deposits. Of in-
terest in this context is also the impact of market concentration. One would
expect that higher market concentration leads to lower funding cost. However,
all market concentration estimates are insigni￿cant throughout our regression
analyses. This might be due to a rather technical issue. Since concentration
measures in single regional markets do not change signi￿cantly year-by-year,
the concentration measure constitutes almost a time invariant ￿xed e￿ect that
is already absorbed in the ￿xed e￿ect dummies. Using a di￿erent methodol-
ogy, e.g. pooled OLS regression, reveals the signi￿cant in￿uence of market
concentration on funding cost. Finally, we control for the local economic en-
vironment a bank operates in. As predicted, coe￿cients for general regional
￿nancial strength (Local GDP) and the Savings Rate are signi￿cantly negative
as these are two main factors driving the overall supply of deposits in a region.
The coe￿cient for the general interest rate level is also signi￿cantly positive
in all regressions.
6 Robustness
We perform several further analyses to con￿rm the robustness of our results.
Overall, our main ￿ndings remain unchanged regardless of the following vari-
ations to the original setup.
As mentioned in section 4, our sample includes more than 170 mergers during
the observation period. As mergers go along with a signi￿cant change in size
of the remaining bank, the relationship between size and funding costs may be
driven or at least distorted by these mergers. In our main analysis we already
control for mergers by including several (lagged) dummy variables into the
regression. To further dispel any concerns in this respect, we generate a second
data set where we consolidate ￿nancial statements of merging institutions
backwards for the whole period before the merger. To do so, we simply add-
up the respective positions in the balance sheets and pro￿t and loss accounts
for those banks involved in a particular merger for the years prior to the
merger and keep only the surviving bank in the sample, thereby eliminating
any direct merger related size e￿ects. The resulting sample contains only those
banks that were active throughout the entire period from 1998 until 2004. In
order to obtain a balanced panel data set we further eliminate all banks for
which we do not have complete information on all required variables for the
period from 1998 to 2004. In total, this sample contains 5,105 observations.
Our main ￿nding, the positive relationship between size and funding costs,
remains highly signi￿cant and does not change in direction or magnitude. The
coe￿cients of the control variables also stay by large unchanged. 7
7 Results are not reported for conciseness reasons but available on request.
17To further con￿rm the size and other related e￿ects from merger activities, we
construct a third data set including M&A transactions only. It includes only
banks that emerged as acquirers in mergers or acquisitions during the period
from 1998 until 2004. The dependent and explaining variables are ￿rst di￿er-
ences of respective ￿nancials and ratios in the year prior to the merger and
of those in the merger year or one or two years following the merger, respec-
tively. This allows a direct view on the impact from a merger driven change
in size on the corresponding change in funding costs. In total, this sample
contains 439 observations from approximately 170 mergers. Table 7 outlines
the empirical results for this robustness check. In line with our ￿ndings in our
primary analysis, all size coe￿cients are highly signi￿cant and positive, thus,
again con￿rming hypothesis H2 that the size e￿ect also holds if it is related to
a merger. Furthermore, we ￿nd that the coe￿cient of bank size is stronger in
magnitude than in our primary analysis when comparing the change in funding
between the year before the merger and the actual merger year (column (1)).
This indicates that funding costs on average increase above the expected size
e￿ect during the year of the merger again con￿rming hypothesis H3. Columns
(2) and (3) reveal that the merger related size e￿ect decreases in the years
following the merger towards the expected size e￿ect (hypothesis H3). Several
control variables become insigni￿cant. We suggest that this is due to the con-
siderably lower number of observations compared to our previous regressions.
To dispel any concerns that our ￿ndings are driven by either savings banks or
cooperative banks in our sample, we run the analyses separately for these two
sub-samples. The positive relationship between bank size and funding costs
turns out to be highly signi￿cant for both sub-samples and also coe￿cients
are of similar magnitude.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate how banks’ average funding costs are in￿uenced
by bank size. We provide strong and robust empirical evidence that bank size
is a key determinant of banks’ funding costs and that funding costs generally
increase in line with bank size suggesting that small banks are able to attract
deposits more cheaply than their larger counterparts. In line with Berger et
al. (2005) we argue that this is the case because smaller banks interact more
personally with customers, operate in customers’ geographic proximity and
have longer and more exclusive relationships than larger banks and, hence,
are able to charge higher prices for their services, i.e. o￿er lower deposit rates.
In previous literature the competitive advantages of small banks from their
proximity to customers and their decentralized organizational set-up have been
frequently discussed with regard to relationship banking, i.e. the bank’s ability
to facilitate monitoring and screening to overcome problems of asymmetric
18information in exclusive lending relationships. Analogous to Boot (2000) we
argue that the advantages found for small banks in facilitating relationship
banking also apply for banking products other than lending and especially for
deposit taking.
Our empirical ￿nding of a strong positive relationship between bank size and
banks’ funding costs is robust across model speci￿cations. In particular, our
results hold when we explicitly control for the bank’s funding mix highlighting
that funding costs at small banks are not only driven by the typically higher
relative share of deposits of bank’s liabilities at small banks. The application
of a particular large data set comprising 80% of local banks in Germany also
gives support to the general validity of our results. As part of our analysis we
emphasize that the positive relationship between bank size and funding costs
does not only hold for organic growth or cross-sectional size di￿erences but
also for non-organic growth. Although slightly smaller in magnitude, funding
cost increase following a merger due to the merger-induced growth in size as
well as increased organizational complexity of the enlarged institution. Other
than the merger-related size e￿ects we ￿nd an additional signi￿cant positive
impact on funding costs in the year of the merger itself on top of the size
e￿ect. We suggest that this is a consequence of management distraction from
day-to-day operations due to integration tasks and the need to o￿er some
customers more competitive deposit rates to prevent them from switching
to another bank as their switching costs are lowered due to the merger. This
e￿ect, however, vanishes in subsequent years suggesting that some of the causes
are temporary in nature and can be o￿set over time. Although there are good
reasons for mergers and acquisitions among banks and the desire to grow in
size (e.g. economies of scale or improved diversi￿cation), our ￿ndings highlight
some potential drawbacks of acquisitive growth - namely, the potential loss of
customer proximity and thus the basis of strong bank-customer-relationships.
When evaluating external growth opportunities banks should consider the
implications of increasing funding costs and whether targeted synergies make
up for the short-fall in income contribution from deposit taking and funding.
Finally, our analyses indicate that the competitive advantages of small banks
leading to comparatively lower average funding costs decrease in magnitude
(not signi￿cance) over time. We argue that technological advances and ￿ercer
competition for deposits in the German market as well as customers’ increasing
preparedness to switch banks to bene￿t from superior conditions are the reason
for this trend.
Our ￿nding of a strong in￿uence of bank size on banks’ funding costs is of
great interest also in an international context as mergers among small local
banks - the key driver of bank growth - are a recent phenomenon not only
in European banking that is expected to continue in the future. At the same
time, net interest income remains by far the most important source of revenue
for most local banks, accounting for approximately 70% of total operating
19revenues in the case of German local banks. The in￿uence of size on funding
costs is of strong economic relevance: our results suggest that an increase
in size by 50%, for example, from EUR 500 million in total assets to EUR
750 million (exemplary for M&A transactions among local banks) increases
funding costs, ceteris paribus, by approximately 18 basis points which relates
to approx. 7% of banks’ average net interest margin.
In sum, our research shows that building and maintaining strong customer
relationships remains a key strength for small banks. This strength does not
only grant small banks an advantage in facilitating monitoring in lending re-
lationships but also yields signi￿cant advantages for their funding activities
as they can a￿ord to pay less interest on their deposits without loosing cus-
tomers or deposits. This paper is the ￿rst to shed more light on banks’ bene￿ts
of customer relationships on products other than lending, especially deposit
taking. Furthermore, this paper is the ￿rst to go beyond the national view
of economic in￿uences on bank performance by considering economic factors
as well as market concentration on a local market level. We suggest further
research in this area to investigate how phenomena known from relationship
banking also impact other bank products using both product- and bank-level
data.
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Table 1: Description of variables
Variable Unit Description
Interest Expenses / Total Lia-
bilities
% Interest expenses divided total liabilities
Calculation: total interest expense / total liabilities
Bank speci￿c variables
Ln(Total Assets) logarithm of
EUR million
Natural logarithm of total assets in million Euros.
Calculation: ln(total assets)
Demand Deposits / Total Lia-
bilities
% Share of funding through customer demand deposits of total
liabilities.
Calculation: demand deposits / total liabilities
Savings Deposits / Total Lia-
bilities
% Share of funding through customer savings deposits of total
liabilities.
Calculation: savings deposits / total liabilities
Deposits from Banks / Total
Liabilities
% Share of funding through deposits from other banks of total
liabilities.
Calculation: deposits with banks / total liabilities
Operating Expenses / Total
Assets
% Quality of management is expected to have a direct impact on
the funding mix. It is approximated by the operating expenses
relative to total assets, which can be interpreted as the overall
(in)e￿ciency with which the bank is run.
Calculation: total operating expenses / total assets
Implicit Interest Payments % Customers often except lower interest rates on deposits in ex-
change for additional bank services free of charge, e.g. free
account handling. These services produce additional operat-
ing cost, which can be seen as implicit interest payments to
the customer to compete for her deposits.
Calculation: (operating expenses ￿ loan loss provisions-(net
commission revenue + other operating revenues)) / total as-
sets
Non-Interest Income / Operat-
ing Revenues
% Non-interest income is included to evaluate the potential cross-
subsidization impact of non-interest income on the funding
costs.
Calculation: net provision income/ (net interest income + net
provision income)
Deposits / Loans % Measured as deposit overhang customer deposits in relation to
customer loans re￿ect the bank￿s ability to fund its lending
business through deposits rather than through capital mar-
kets.
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Variable Unit Description
Calculation: total customer deposits / total customer loans
Equity / Total Assets % The capitalization of the bank in terms of the amount of equity
relative to the size of the total assets is used as a proxy for
the general risk aversion of the bank’s management (compare
also Maudos and de Guevara (2004) as well as McShane and
Sharpe (1985)).
Calculation: equity / total assets
M&A activity dummy vari-
able
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respective bank
has been involved in a merger or an acquisition in the respec-
tive year.
Market concentration
Local HHI # Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl-Index of market shares used to esti-
mate market concentration and competition. Since total assets
for all banks are not available on a district level, we approx-
imate the market share with the share of branches (compare
Fischer and Hempell (2006)).
Calculation:
Pn
j=1(msj)2
n=number of banks in local market, msj=market share (in
terms of branches) of jth bank
Macroeconomic variables
Interest Rate % The risk free interest rate for one month (EURIBOR) is used
to control for the general interest rate level. It is an annual
value calculated based on monthly averages.
Yield Curve Slope % The yield curve slope is used to control for the yield di￿erences
between short- and long-term maturities.
Calculation: 10-year government bond rate - 1-month Euribor
rate
Local GDP EUR The economical strength of a region is measured by its average
gross domestic product (GDP) per inhabitant. It is calculated
on administrative district level.
Calculation: GDP in district / number of residents in district
Savings Rate % The savings rate of the household controls for the savings ac-
tivity in a region, which determines the general availability of
deposits. It is available only on the state-level.
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Descriptive statistics for bank speci￿c characteristics by size class (mean)
This table presents the means of the bank speci￿c variables for the unbalanced sample of public savings
and cooperative banks in Germany for the period 1994-2004. While the column "Complete sample" presents
means of the bank speci￿c variables of all banks the columns to its right present means for di￿erent size
classes with size measured as Total Assets in EUR million.
Variables Unit Complete
Sample <200 >=200
<400
>=400
<800 >=800
Interest Expenses / Total Liabilities % 3.22 3.20 3.21 3.17 3.27
Ln(Total Assets) EUR million 1,205.30 136.43 294.29 572.26 2,333.88
Operating Expenses / Total Assets % 2.42 2.57 2.68 2.50 2.20
Implicit Interest Payments % 1.64 1.81 1.78 1.69 1.49
Equity / Total Assets % 4.88 5.68 5.18 4.91 4.58
Deposits / Loans % 121.61 115.22 118.92 123.79 122.60
Note: All di￿erences are signi￿cant at the 1% level (t-test).
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for the local market environment (mean)
This table presents the means of the market concentration variable Local HHI and local economic variables
for the unbalanced sample of public savings and cooperative banks in Germany for the period 1994-2004.
Means are presented for the complete sample as well as for banks in urban, rural, West German and East
Germany, respectively.
Variables Unit Complete
Sample City Rural
area
West
Germany
East Ger-
many
Local HHI # 1,638.53 1,411.34 1,719.96 1,577.34 2,164.56
Interest Rate % 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25
Local GDP per inhabitant EUR 25.93 36.87 22.02 26.92 17.88
Savings Rate % 10.06 9.90 10.11 10.21 8.84
Note: All di￿erences are signi￿cant at the 1% level (t-test).
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Descriptive statistics for bank speci￿c and local market characteristics over time
(mean)
This table presents the means of bank speci￿c and local market characteristics for the unbalanced sample
of public savings and cooperative banks in Germany for each year for the period 1994-2004.
Variables Unit 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bank speci￿c characteristics
Interest Expenses / Total Liabilities % 3.67 3.35 3.44 3.53 3.18 2.82 2.57
Ln(Total Assets) EUR million 1,074.78 1,082.65 1,172.34 1,228.46 1,264.72 1,290.53 1,299.14
Operating Expenses / Total Assets % 2.44 2.40 2.49 2.41 2.39 2.45 2.40
Implicit Interest Payments % 1.69 1.59 1.67 1.67 1.66 1.63 1.56
Equity / Total Assets % 4.47 4.59 4.78 4.81 4.97 5.15 5.32
Deposits / Loans % 125.65 121.36 115.48 120.10 121.57 122.74 124.73
Local market environment
Local HHI # 1,649.08 1,642.17 1,642.73 1,634.83 1,637.36 1,640.34 1,624.69
Interest Rate % 3.52 2.87 4.18 4.39 3.33 2.38 2.08
Local GDP per inhabitant EUR 24.14 24.78 25.61 26.19 26.51 26.70 27.33
Savings Rate % 10.23 9.59 9.42 9.65 10.19 10.56 10.74
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The e￿ects of size on bank’s funding costs - full sample
This table presents coe￿cient estimates from regressions relating funding costs to bank size. As dependent variable
we use Interest Expenses / Total Liabilities as measure of Banks’ Funding Costs. All regressions are applied to the
full sample comprising 5,686 observations from approximately 800 public savings and cooperative banks. Regression
analyses include observations from years 1998 to 2004, however, the dataset does not comprise observations for every
bank for every year due to the unbalanced nature of the dataset. All regressions include bank ￿xed e￿ects dummy
variables and year dummy variables (not reported). As estimation technique, we use ￿xed e￿ects regression models
(Least Square Dummy Variable Approach) with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. P-values are reported in
brackets.
Interest Expenses / Total Liabilities
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Bank speci￿c characteristics
Ln(Total Assets) 0.452*** 0.377*** 0.445*** 0.478*** 0.452*** 0.450*** 0.435***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Demand Deposits /
Total Liabilities
-0.010***
[0.000]
Savings Deposits /
Total Liabilities
0.004***
[0.000]
Deposits from Banks /
Total Liabilities
0.008***
[0.000]
Operating Expenses /
Total Assets
0.394*** 0.416*** 0.420*** 0.314*** 0.394*** 0.309*** 0.421***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Implicit Interest Pay-
ments
-0.110*** -0.139*** -0.168*** -0.022 -0.110*** -0.114***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.499] [0.001] [0.000]
Non-Interest Income /
Operating Revenues
0.018***
[0.000]
Equity / Total Assets -0.048*** -0.025** -0.023* -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.034***
[0.000] [0.026] [0.069] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Deposits / Loans -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.078] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005]
Growth Rate Deposits (%) 0.006***
[0.000]
M&A activity 0.315***
[0.000]
M&A activity (lagged
t-1) -0.051**
[0.019]
M&A activity (lagged
t-2) -0.063***
[0.007]
M&A activity *
Ln(Total Assets) -0.077**
[0.018]
Local market environment
Local HHI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.929] [0.275] [0.935] [0.963] [0.929] [0.989] [0.625]
Interest Rate 0.299*** 0.315*** 0.371*** 0.310*** 0.293*** 0.306***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Yield Curve Slope -0.430***
[0.000]
Local GDP -0.010*** -0.007** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.007**
[0.001] [0.026] [0.006] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.011]
Savings Rate -0.240*** -0.191*** -0.104*** -0.237*** -0.240*** -0.244*** -0.200***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Constant 2.635*** 2.180*** 0.746 1.993*** 4.122*** 2.694*** 1.777***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.235] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 5,832 5,007 4,174 5,832 5,832 5,832 5,832
R-squared 0.882 0.892 0.919 0.884 0.882 0.881 0.887
***signi￿cant at 0 to 1 percent level, **signi￿cant at 1 to 5 percent level, *signi￿cant at 5 to 10 percent level, others:
signi￿cant at above 10 percent level
25Table 6
The e￿ects of size on bank’s funding costs - di￿erent time periods
This table presents coe￿cient estimates from regressions relating funding costs to bank size. As dependent variable
we use Interest Expenses / Total Liabilities as measure of Banks’ Funding Costs. Regression analyses include
observations from di￿erent time periods: 1998-2000 (Column 1), 2001-2004 (Column 2), 1998-1999 (Column 3),
2000-2001 (Column 4) and 2002-2004 (Column 5). Analyses for di￿erent time periods do not include the same
number of banks and observations due to the unbalanced nature of the dataset. All regressions include bank ￿xed
e￿ects dummy variables and year dummy variables (not reported). As estimation technique, we use ￿xed e￿ects
regression models (Least Square Dummy Variable Approach) with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. P-
values are reported in brackets.
Interest Expenses / Total Liabilities
1998-2000 2001-2004 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2004
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bank speci￿c characteristics
Ln(Total Assets) 0.910*** 0.623*** 1.367*** 0.894*** 0.781***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Operating Expenses / Total Assets 0.389*** 0.499*** 0.298*** 0.666*** 0.496***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000]
Implicit Interest Payments -0.084 -0.137*** -0.054 -0.237*** -0.169***
[0.160] [0.000] [0.397] [0.001] [0.000]
Equity / Total Assets -0.098*** -0.017 0.043 0.033 -0.002
[0.001] [0.212] [0.309] [0.435] [0.878]
Deposits / Loans -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
[0.005] [0.402] [0.111] [0.204] [0.687]
Local market environment
Local HHI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.691] [0.639] [0.468] [0.194] [0.275]
Interest Rate 0.01 0.411*** 0.575***
[0.447] [0.000] [0.000]
Local GDP -0.008 -0.007 -0.021** -0.01 -0.009
[0.226] [0.140] [0.014] [0.243] [0.101]
Savings Rate -0.125*** -0.038 -0.006 -0.121* 0.109***
[0.006] [0.308] [0.943] [0.083] [0.006]
Constant -3.068** -4.225*** -4.007*** -3.551** -4.598***
[0.022] [0.000] [0.004] [0.049] [0.000]
Observations 2,491 3,341 1,657 1,668 2,507
R-squared 0.885 0.929 0.941 0.933 0.933
***signi￿cant at 0 to 1 percent level, **signi￿cant at 1 to 5 percent level, *signi￿cant at 5 to 10 percent level, others:
signi￿cant at above 10 percent level; Note: Note: Interest rate variable has been dropped from regressions (3) and
(4) due to collinearity.
26Table 7
The e￿ects of size on bank’s funding costs - the e￿ects of M&A
This table presents coe￿cient estimates from regressions relating changes in funding costs to
changes in bank size at merging banks. As dependent variable we use the ￿rst di￿erence of
our funding costs variable Interest Expenses / Total Liabilities. As explanatory variables we
include the ￿rst di￿erences of our bank size variable Total Assets and control variables. First
di￿erences for the respective variables are calculated between the pre-merger year (t-1) and
the merger year (Column 1), the ￿rst post-merger year (Column 2) and the second merger year
(Column 3). Regression analyses include observations of all banks that have been involved
in merger between 1998 and 2004 for the years before and after their respective mergers.
All regressions include bank ￿xed e￿ects dummy variables and year dummy variables (not
reported). As estimation technique, we use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression models
with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. P-values are reported in brackets.
∆ Interest Expenses / Total Liabilities
(1) (2) (3)
Variables ∆(t-1;t) ∆(t-1;t+1) ∆(t-1;t+2)
Bank speci￿c characteristics
∆ Total Assets 0.656*** 0.327*** 0.378***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.003]
∆ Operating Expenses / Total Assets 0.495** 0.380** -0.084
[0.047] [0.028] [0.647]
∆ Implicit Interest Payments 0.088 -0.194 0.472*
[0.601] [0.275] [0.099]
∆ Equity / Total Assets 0.032 -0.061 -0.077
[0.557] [0.211] [0.111]
∆ Deposits / Loans -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.003
[0.004] [0.000] [0.109]
Local market environment
∆ Local HHI -3.786** -0.125 -1281
[0.042] [0.815] [0.136]
∆ Interest Rate -0.625** 0.114 0.253**
[0.017] [0.139] [0.042]
∆ Local GDP -0.044*** -0.017* -0.033***
[0.000] [0.053] [0.003]
∆ Savings Rate 0.257*** 0.172*** 0.170**
[0.007] [0.001] [0.012]
Constant -1.059*** -0.053 -0.436
[0.000] [0.703] [0.180]
Observations 176 161 134
R-squared 0.892 0.925 0.900
***signi￿cant at 0 to 1 percent level, **signi￿cant at 1 to 5 percent level, *signi￿cant at 5
to 10 percent level, others: signi￿cant at above 10 percent level; Note: Note: Interest rate
variable has been dropped from regressions (3) and (4) due to collinearity.
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